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Abstract 
Multiple barriers exist to conducting contact investigations for tuberculosis after bus 
travel, and the degree of transmission risk to bus contacts is uncertain. We describe a 
patient with active infectious tuberculosis and the contact investigation that took place 
following her 5 hour bus trip across the United States-Canadian border.  
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Introduction 
Although exposure to persons with active tuberculosis on a bus likely carries the risk of 
transmission, it is not clear how great a risk is involved and what circumstances may 
affect that risk (Edelson & Phypers, 2011).  While guidelines have been published for 
investigation of tuberculosis exposures on airplanes (World Health Organization [WHO], 
2008), there are no generally recognized guidelines for investigating exposures on buses.  
 
We present a case of a patient with active infectious TB who traveled by bus across an 
international border and the subsequent contact investigation among bus passengers.  
This case also highlights the coordinated efforts required among public health and border 
security authorities when responding to an infectious traveler.  Because this investigation 
comprised a public health response based on regulatory authority, it was exempted from 
human subjects review. 
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Case Report 
A woman living in the Chicago metropolitan area was hospitalized in 2008 with fever, 
cough, weight loss, and fatigue.  Chest radiograph demonstrated extensive alveolar 
infiltrates bilaterally and at least one cavity.  Sputum smears demonstrated 4+ (“many”) 
acid-fast bacilli (AFB) on microscopy and was positive for Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
by polymerase chain reaction (PCR).  M. tuberculosis was culture confirmed, and the 
isolate was determined to be susceptible to all first-line anti-tuberculosis medications.  
 
Upon hospital discharge, the patient began directly observed therapy (DOT) with the 
local health department.  However, 12 days after initiating therapy, the patient defaulted 
from treatment.  Over the next 6 days, multiple attempts were made to locate her, at 
which time a family member reported that she may have traveled out of the country. 
 
The local health authorities notified the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Chicago Quarantine Station about the case, and the patient was added to the Do 
Not Board (DNB) list.  The DNB list, managed by CDC and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), is a public health tool which prevents individuals with 
infectious conditions that may constitute a serious public health threat from boarding 
commercial aircraft.  A Lookout record was also placed for this patient.  A Lookout 
record is a DHS tool that prompts a thorough review of an individual if he or she attempts 
to enter the United States through an international airport, seaport or land border port of 
entry.  DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would be alerted to her potential as a 
public health threat and notify CDC (CDC, 2008).  Within DHS, CBP and Coast Guard 
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officers are required, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 268(b), to aid CDC “in the enforcement of 
quarantine rules and regulations.”   CDC’s authority to detain individuals at ports of entry 
stem from the Public Service Act (42 U.S.C, §§ 264-272), Interstate Quarantine (42 CFR 
Part 70), and Foreign Quarantine (42 CFR Part 71), which authorize the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to create and enforce regulations to prevent 
the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases from foreign 
countries into U.S. states and territories.  
 
Approximately 2 weeks later, the Lookout record alerted CBP that the patient was 
entering Detroit, Michigan from Windsor, Ontario on a commercial bus that originated in 
Toronto, Ontario.  CBP notified the CDC Detroit Quarantine Station whose staff advised 
CBP to detain the patient at the border, provide her with a face mask, isolate her, and 
collect contact information from other passengers. The patient was hospitalized under a 
local emergency isolation order.  Multiple sputum smears were AFB positive (+1 to +3), 
which subsequently grew M. tuberculosis on culture.  
 
The bus route from Toronto to Detroit lasted approximately 5 hours, and the patient was 
observed coughing during travel.  She was one of 33 passengers to board the bus in 
Toronto.  Two hours later, the bus stopped in London, Ontario for 30 minutes where nine 
additional passengers boarded the bus and no one disembarked.  Approximately 2 hours 
later, the bus stopped in Windsor and 27 passengers exited.  Aside from the patient and 
her three immediate family members, 13 travelers, including two bus drivers, were on 
board when the bus crossed the border from Windsor to Detroit.  A contact investigation 
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was initiated for the travelers still aboard the bus at the time of border crossing.  As no 
locating information was available for the passengers who had exited the bus prior to the 
border crossing, the Ontario public health authorities issued a press release encouraging 
any passengers on this bus trip to seek medical care.  
 
Of the 40 non-family member bus contacts, 24 were identified, including 13 contacts who 
crossed the border with the patient and 11 who responded to the Canadian press release 
(Figure 1).  Most of these contacts were either Canadian or US citizens, and local public 
health agencies were informed about the passengers who resided in their jurisdictions; 
however, three contacts were neither US nor Canadian citizens and had returned to their 
home countries before they could be evaluated.  Both US and Canadian contact 
investigation guidelines use a 5-mm cut-off size for interpreting a single tuberculin skin 
test (TST) result;  if a negative TST result is obtained less than 8 weeks after exposure 
ended, a second TST should be placed no earlier than 8 weeks post-exposure (CDC, 
2005; Tannenbaum, Yuan, and Wallington, 2007).  Of the 21 individuals who were 
evaluated, 15 had complete evaluations: 13 had negative TST results at least 8 weeks 
after exposure and two had positive TST results (both had normal chest radiographs); one 
individual with a history of military service abroad had a 14 mm TST result at 6 weeks 
post-exposure and the other individual, who was born in a high-TB prevalence country, 
had a 15 mm TST result at 9 weeks.  It is not known where these individuals sat on the 
bus in relation to the index case.  Six individuals had incomplete evaluations: one person 
had a TST placed but did not return to have the test read and five had negative TST 
results within 8 weeks of exposure.  Six individuals who tested negative at least 8 weeks 
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post-exposure were known to have boarded in Toronto, including two passengers seated 
within three rows of the index patient; data regarding origination of boarding is unknown 
for the remainder of the passengers.  
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Figure 1   
Investigation of travelers exposed to tuberculosis on a bus –  
United States and Canada, 2008         
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note 
a. Excludes 3 family members who also were on the bus and includes 2 bus 
drivers 
b. Tuberculin Skin Test 
c. One individual born in a high TB disease prevalence country (≥20 
cases/100,000 persons); the other with history of military service abroad 
(locations unknown) 
40 bus contacts a 
16 (40%) not contacted 
24 (60%) contacted 
3 (7.5%) lost to follow-up prior 
to initial TST b placement 
13 (32.5%) with 
negative TST >8 
weeks after exposure 
6 (15%) only had a TST ≤ 8 
weeks after exposure 
2 (5%) with positive 
TST c  
2 with normal 
chest radiographs 
5 with negative 
TST 
1 failed to return 
for reading 
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Discussion 
Although likely transmission has been reported via a single bus or train trip exposure 
(Moore, Valway, Ihle, and Onorato, 1999), most published reports supporting the risk of 
TB transmission to other bus passengers have involved students who have had recurrent 
daily contact with the exposed individuals, often over a period of months (Neira-Munoz, 
Smith, Cockcroft, Basher, and Abubakar, 2008; Edelson & Phypers, 2011).  In this case, 
exposure to an individual with infectious tuberculosis was for a single 5 ½-hour period on 
a commercial bus.   
 
With fewer air exchanges per minute and no standard use of high-efficiency particulate 
air (HEPA) filters, the typical bus environment would likely be more conducive to 
transmission of respiratory pathogens than an airplane cabin (WHO, 2008; Huston, 
2009).  Unlike for airplanes, routine bus contact investigations are often not done.  Bus 
travel typically does not involve assigned seating or retention of passenger manifests for 
more than 24 hours, which are both key tools in conducting airline contact investigations.  
With limited resources, bus investigations may be also regarded as a low priority 
compared to other TB control activities.  Given these difficulties, the index patient should 
be determined to be highly infectious before a bus contact investigation is considered.  
This index patient had symptomatic, smear positive, cavitary TB, and two of her three 
immediate family members were found to have positive TST results in follow-up 
evaluation.        
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Utilizing the public health travel restriction tools facilitated this bus investigation by 
alerting CBP officials about the infectious traveler; CBP notified CDC quarantine staff of 
the situation before the passengers disembarked, which allowed CBP to obtain contact 
information at the port of entry.  This underscores the value of the Lookout record and 
CDC-CBP cooperation in contact investigations.   
 
Although 53% of the bus contacts began evaluation, the overall complete evaluation rate 
was only 38%, highlighting the difficulty in ensuring adequate follow-up, even with the 
collaboration of international, federal, state, and local health officials.  This limited 
contact investigation did not identify probable transmission events.  Only two bus 
contacts had positive TST results, which given other potential risk exposures could not be 
directly attributed to the recent bus travel. 
 
Defining the risk of TB infection from bus exposures requires further study, especially 
considering the association of bus travel with low social economic status (SES) and the 
incidence of TB attributed to SES.  Bus contact investigations under some circumstances 
appear feasible.  Public health authorities should recognize the resources available to 
them to overcome some of the barriers to bus investigations while also emphasizing 
prevention.  In general, travelers with communicable respiratory illness should be 
discouraged from boarding public conveyances.  
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